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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE LAW AND 
POLITICS OF REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY 
CALVIN MASSEY* 
Abstract: This Article examines several legal and political issues raised by 
reparations for slavery and offers a skeptical appraisal of both the wisdom of 
reparations and their potential for success. There are a number of legal ob-
stacles to courtroom-based reparations, including the difficulty of proving 
duty, causation, and damages; technical barriers such as limitations statutes 
and laches; and constitutional problems such as standing and courts' strict 
scrutiny of racial classifications. In the political realm, the difficulty of iden-
tif}lng those who should pay and those who should receive reparations, and 
the impact of a successful reparations scheme on race relations in America, 
should counsel against the \\isdom of reparations for slayery. 
When grappling with providing reparations for slavery, two dis-
tinct categories of issues emerge: legal and political. While the divi-
sion between law and politics is murky at the margins, the distinctly 
legal issues involved in slavery reparations focHs on the doctrinal pos-
sibilities of obtaining damages for slavery, and the policy wisdom of 
altering legal doctrine, if necessary, to afford such a remedy. Part I of 
this Article will discuss the legal limitations of seeking reparations for 
slavery, recognizing that a felt sense of injustice, by itself, is not a 
sufficient foundation for restitution under private law. Part II will dis-
CllSS the political problems inherent in slavery reparations, problems 
that raise broad questions of whether and how we should use the po-
litical system to provide either a massive redistribution of wealth to 
those claiming entitlement to reparations for slavery, or some other 
socio-political scheme to redress the present effects of slavery. Part II 
of this Article will argue that approaching reparations from a political 
perspective would ultimately prove more problematic than cathartic. 
Finally, at the very intersection of law and politics lies the constitu-
tional question of whether, or to what extent, such redistribution is 
permissible. Part III of this Article will address why it is unlikely that 
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reparations for slavery will overcome the strict scrutiny of racial 
classifications. This Article concludes that reparations for slavery face 
numerous, and likely insurmountable, legal and political hurdles. 
I. PRIVATE LAW 
Professor Hylton divides tort claims for slavery reparations into 
those seeking a conventional form of justice and those seeking to redis-
tribute wealth to improve overall social welfare} Under the justice ap-
proach, specific victims must identifY the particular individuals or enti-
ties that harmed them, the precise acts that led to their injury, and the 
sum necessary to compensate their injuries.2 The social welfare ap-
proach, however, "aims for a significant redistribution of wealth," rather 
than achieving '1ustice in any discrete case."3 According to Professor 
Hylton, the social welfare approach "shares much in common with the 
. .. tobacco litigation [, which] led to a large-scale redistribution [of 
wealth] from cigarette manufacturers and their customers to other 
groups in society [in order to] compensate society for some of the 'ex-
ternalities' imposed by the cigarette industry."4 As Professor Hylton ac-
knowledges, there are significant differences between the social welfare 
approach and the conventional justice approach. This Article will ex-
amine the social welfare method first, and then briefly discuss the con-
ventional justice method. 
A. Social Welfare 
The social welfare approach to slavery reparations seeks to invoke 
the tort system to accomplish massive wealth redistribution. Although 
the tobacco litigation achieved this goal (albeit to a lesser degree than 
that sought by reparations advocates), there are vast differences be-
tween the two cases. The social welfare approach to slavery repara-
tions faces some daunting hurdles. First, slavery, although unjust, was 
legal. Second, an accounting of the effects of slavery, while informa-
tive, will not serve any real legal purpose. Third, the passage of time 
raises problematic questions of duty, causation, and damages. 
1 Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 31, 32-
33 (2004) [hereinafter Hylton, Framework]. 
2Id. 
3Id. at 33. 
4 Id. at 33-34. 
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1. The Legality of Slavery 
The formal legality of American slavery poses a substantial obstacle 
to a tort claim for slavery reparations. Although slavery was a unique 
institution, in that the state largely permitted slaveholders to wield ab-
solute power over slaves, this seeming absence of law did not make slav-
erya completely lawless practice. There were at least seven prmisions of 
the 1787 Constitution that recognized slavery as a part of the legal or-
der of the states.5 However stirring Jefferson's statement of human 
equality may be, it is familiar history that the drafters of our constitu-
tion wove slavery into our fundamental law from the beginnings of our 
republic. Slavery was more than simply legal; it was a recognized, fun-
damentally constitutional fact. Sobering and disquieting though that 
may be, it remains fact. It bears repeating that there was no formal ab-
sence of law governing the relationship between slave and master. 
\Vhile it is true that most of the law concerning slaves cemented the 
subjugation of slave to master, and that laws whose aim was to inhibit 
the excessive abuse of slaves were largely ineffective, laws existed pur-
porting to govern the relationship between master and slave.6 As unsat-
isfying and unjust as these laws were, there was no legal void. 
Even if one could persuasively argue that the master-slave rela-
tionship was a legal void, that would not vitiate its formal legality as a 
defense to a con temporary tort claim. Consider a rough modern ana-
logue, recognizing that there can be no true analogy to the horror of 
slavery. Until fairly recently, family relationships were also largely ex-
empt from legal inspection; the state ceded its vast power to parents 
so that they could define the "law" gOYerning their relationships with 
their children. Even in the heyday of "Father Knows Best," law ,vas not 
totally absent from the family. Would it be proper to conclude that, 
because law was largely absen t from the family, an emotionally cold 
and distant parent (but one who did not intentionally inflict emo-
tional distress upon his children) could not assert the lawfulness of his 
parental disinterest as a defense to a tort claim made by his child? 
5 Sec U.s. CON ST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths clause); art. 1, § 8, cl. 15 (militia clause); 
art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (non-importation clause); art. I, § 9, d. 2 (suspension of habeas corpus 
clause); art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (fugitive clause); art. IV, § 4 (guarantee clause); art. V (prohibit-
ing amendment of non-importation clause prior to 1808). 
6 Sec generally SLAVERY AND THE LAW (Paul Finkelman ed., 1996). 
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2. Accounting for Slavery 
There is a vast moral chasm between slavery and an emotionally 
cold parent, and it is ultimately upon moral grounds that one must 
consider slavery reparations. While the political system is the better ve-
hicle for sorting out moral claims of entitlement, we must at least 
evaluate the moral claims of the social welfare model in light of the ex-
isting architecture of tort law. The most attractive (albeit possibly inef-
fective) way in which to articulate those moral claims in tort doctrine is 
through the seldom-used remedy of an accounting. An accounting-an 
honest and complete accounting of the profits whipped from the backs 
of black Americans held in slavery-is the "truth" part of an Arnerican 
version of the South Mrican exercise in "truth and reconciliation." 
Entitlement to an accounting depends upon proving the exis-
tence of a tort, and the problems of duty and causation may prove to 
be as insuperable here as they are with respect to tort claims seeking 
damages.7 In more prosaic tort settings, one might wonder whether 
there is any point to an accounting in the absence of any available 
damages remedy. Such an accounting would merely be a recitation of 
lawful gains for which no one is entitled to compensation. For the 
moment, however, let us ignore the real-world elephant of tort liability 
and simply examine the accounting remedy in isolation. When we ac-
knowledge that a nominally lawful past practice was morally abomina-
ble and bereft of law in practice, even if there are no legally cogniza-
ble present victims or villains, the accounting remedy becomes far 
more relevant as a practical way to compute, in utilitarian terms, the 
cost of this morally repugnant past practice. 
The principal value of an accounting for slavery lies not so much 
in the legal realm but in the social and political world. An accounting, 
even if limited to the benefits obtained by specific defendants in a tort 
action, would serve only to focus public attention on the extent of the 
wealth amassed by whites from the labor of black slaves.s This, in it-
self, might have value. The number of Americans who truly under-
stand this point is astonishingly low. Some years ago, at a convention 
of the American Society of Legal History held in Charleston, South 
Carolina, I took a tour of old Charleston in the company of my fellow 
academicians and a few outsiders. As we swept through fabulous man-
7 See infra text accompanying notes 9-15. 
8 See. e.g., RICHARD F. AMERICA, PAYING THE SOCIAL DEBT: 'NHAT WHITE AMERICA 
OWES BLACK AMERICA 6-8,17-19 (1993); R'l.NDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA 
OWES TO BLACKS 206-07, 240-42 (2000). 
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sion after fabulous mansion, one of our company (I hope not an aca-
demician) inquired innocently of our tour guide, a blue-blooded 
Charlestonian, "vVhere did the money come from to build these 
places?" Before our guide could answer, Professor Paul Finkelman, 
who was standing next to me, blurted out, "From the backs of slaves!" 
He was absolutely correct, but I still wonder how our tour guide would 
have replied. Would she have said rice or indigo, leaving unspoken 
who worked those fields? Or would she have recognized and identified 
slavery as the brutally efficient form of wealth generation that it was in 
the plantation economy of the old South? An accounting, via the tort 
system, would definitively answer that question, and answer it in the 
form of legal judgmeJ1t, not merely in the form of an economist's opin-
ion, or an idealist's cri de coew: 
Therein lie some additional problems. Why is it that a legal 
judgment of an accounting would have greater societal impact than 
similar pronouncements in the movies, on a PBS documentary, on the 
op-ed pages of the New York Times, or out of the mouth of a presiden-
tial candidate? A legal judgment would be the end-result of a process 
that inevitably narrows focus, whether through application of the 
rules of evidence or by other aspects of legal process. Might such a 
judgment, especially because it would be utterly empty of force, be 
simply Shakespearean sound and fury, signif)'ing nothing? 
3. Passage of Time Problems 
An even greater hurdle than the legal validity of slavery at the 
time it existed is the passage of time problem. This manifests itself in 
the form of insuperable proof problems with respect to duty, causa-
tion, and damages, to say nothing of the more technical issues of limi-
tations statutes and laches. Two types of tort claims might be brought 
to recover damages for slavery, but each claim is initially dependent 
on overcoming the hurdle of slavery's legal validity during its exis-
tence. The first such claim would seek damages for the wrongful re-
straint suffered by slaves; the second would seek restitution based on 
unjust enrichment. 
a. Damages for Wrongflll Constraint 
The problems with the first claim are duty, causation, and proof 
of damages. Duty raises the question of whether a contemporary de-
fendant owed and breached a duty to the contemporary plaintiff. 
Consider two types of defendants, the individual descendant of 
wealthy white slaveholders and the corporate enterprise, still existing, 
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that derived profits from slavery in its corporate past. Let us assume 
(probably unrealistically) that the blue-blooded Charleston tour guide 
is the product of an absolutely pure genetic chain that, once followed 
back to before 1865, consists exclusively of white slave holding South 
Carolinians who lived in those Charleston mansions. Let us further 
assume that our tour guide lives today in one of those mansions, an 
inheritance that has passed continuously through her family, resting 
for the moment in her. She would now be enjoying the fruit of a tree 
planted and watered by the sweat wrung from the brow of the ances-
tor of her neighbor, a fellow citizen of Charleston (let us imagine him 
to be a Colonel in the United States Marine Corps). What duty to the 
Colonel does the tour guide owe that she has breached? No doubt her 
ancestor breached many duties owed by law and morality to the ances-
tor of the Colonel, but what principle of law imputes those foul 
breaches to his fourth or fifth generation descendant? The principle 
of corruption of blood is foreign to our institutions; do we really wish 
to revive it, even if it were constitutionally permissible to do so? 
Now consider duty in the context of the corporate defendant. 
Corporations, as fictional and immortal persons, are surely liable for 
their breaches of duty that occurred prior to the end of slavery. This 
leaves open the question of who can claim recovery for those breaches 
of a corporation's duty. Imagine a corporate trafficker in humans dur-
ing the nineteenth century that is still in existence. Surely that corpora-
tion owed and breached a duty to the slave (assuming that slavery's 
nominal legality is no defense); but did that corporation, by its long-ago 
actions, violate a duty owed to a contemporary descendant of the slave? 
If so, may I also recover from a hypothetical corporation that breached 
its contract with my ancestor by holding him in indentured servitude 
for a year longer than stipulated? What duty does the corporation owe 
me, as distinct from my ancestor? To put the question into yet another 
context, may the descendant of a Titanic sinking victim recover from 
the corporate successor to the White Star Line? 
Another problematic consideration is causation, which invokes the 
question of whether the injury presently complained of was a foresee-
able product of the defendant's conduct. It makes no difference to this 
issue whether the defendant is the Charleston tour guide or the corpo-
rate slave trader. In either case, assuming YOll have concluded that it is 
appropriate to attribute to the tour guide the sins of her ancestors, it is 
necessary to wrestle with the issue of whether that past conduct has 
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caused lllJury to a contemporary plaintiff.9 Satisfaction of this causal 
link may occur through several measures. Compared to whites, blacks 
in America remain poorer, facing shorter life expectancies, are less 
educated, and face a greater likelihood of criminal victimization, 
among other ills.1° While these facts may constitute circumstantial evi-
dence of causation, another attempt to establish a causal link is the 
claim that slavery embedded in American society the "resilient virus" of 
racism, which tends "to replicate itself in successive generations."l1 If 
one starts from these propositions, the proximate cause claim becomes 
an assertion that slavery caused racism and that racism is responsible 
for the disadvantaged position of black Americans. Neither assertion is 
incontestable; racism can and does exist where slayery never did, and 
racism is surely just one among a number of contributors to this de-
plorable state of affairs. One need not subscribe to Professor 
Mc\Vhorter's yiew of the ills of black America12 to recognize that white 
racism is not the sole and exclusive cause of the social ills that beset 
black Americans. It is a plausible thesis that the well-meant culture of 
the welfare state has been a significant contributor to the disadvantages 
that beset many black Americans today,l3 
9 It is essentially on this ground that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in 
Cato v. United States, concluded that African-American plaintiffs who sought to recover 
reparations from the United States for slavery lacked standing to assert the claim. See 70 
F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995). 
10 See l\fELVIN L. OUVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTU/WIIITE WEALTH: A 
NE'" PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 85-90, 109-11 (1995) (discllssing wealth dis-
parities and educational differences); STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, 
AMERICA IN BLACK AND ""IIITE 263-68 (1997) (discussing criminal victimization); Dorothy 
A. Brown et al., Social SeC1ll'ity Reform: Risks, Returns, and Race, 9 CORNELL]' L. & PUB. POL'y 
633,637 (2000) (discussing shorter life expectancies). 
11 See KEITH N. HYLTON, SLAVERY AND TORT LAW 32 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, ''''ork-
ing Paper No. 03-02, 2003, Soc. Science Research Network Elec. Paper Collection) [here-
inafter HYLTON, SLAVERY AND TORTl. at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/HyltonK 
012803abstract.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003). 
12 See generally JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK 
AMERICA (2000) (discussing three manifestations of the "ideological sea of troubles plagu-
ing black America": the Cult ofVictimology, Separatism, and Anti-intellectualism). 
13 Consider the followi.ng: In 1995 the median income of black two-parent families ,vas 
88% that of white two-paren t families, but the median income of all black families was only 
61 % of all white families. /d. at 10. The disparity is attributable to the low income of many 
black si.ngle mothers. /d. l\1cWhorter also notes that a majority of blacks (56%) live in the 
South, a region notorious for wages lower than the rest of the country, and that the rate of 
increase in median pay was faster among blacks than whites in the 1990s. Id. In mid-twen tieth 
century America more than two-thirds of all black children were born into a two-parent fam-
ily; by the end of the century more than two-thi.rds of all black children were born into a 
single mother family, a statistic leading one pair of researchers to conclude that this family 
structure is what divides poor blacks from middle-class or well-to-do blacks. THERNSTROM & 
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Whatever the general social causation that may be at work, it is a 
much harder proposition to defend the causal linkage between the 
presen t injuries of any particular plain tiff (or even the class of all pre-
sent descendants of American slaves) and the past specific tort of 
wrongful constraint attributed to today's defendants. Consider an 
analogous problem. In the unitary school desegregation cases, such as 
Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court exhibited a willingness to sever the 
causal link between past unconstitutional de jure racial discrimination 
and the de facto racial disparity that exists in the present pupil com-
position of schools formally governed by de jure racial discrimina-
tion.14 If that causal link is so easy to sever, what is the likelihood that 
courts dealing with a tort claim for slavery reparations will find slavery 
to be a proximate cause of today's racial disparities in wealth? 
Finally, even if duty and causation do not pose insurmountable 
hurdles, one must wonder about the speculative nature of the dam-
ages. It is a familiar principle to litigators that claims for lost profits 
will fail unless there is specific proof of the opportunities in hand lost 
as a result of someone's tortious conduct. That principle is applicable 
here. Calculation of the economic loss suffered by any given present-
day descendant of an American slave attributable to the wrongful 
confinement of slaves is so speculative as to be an exercise in imagina-
tion. Perhaps that is why reparationists' estimates of the total such loss 
are so wildly disparate. 15 We have no way of determining the precise 
cost of the labor value or of the emotional costs extracted from slaves. 
Even more difficult is knowing how much of that sum would have 
been passed on to the next generation, and how much of that value 
would survive transmission through four or five succeeding genera-
tions. It is safe to generalize that blacks in America would be better off 
economically today if the full value of slave labor and the emotional 
costs of slavery had been distributed to newly emancipated slaves in 
1865, but it is impossible to know how much better off today's black 
Americans would be, if at all. It is even more speculative to try pin-
ning a number on the loss suffered by any given contemporary incli-
THERNSTROM, supra note 10, at 237, 239-11. It is a matter of debate what caused this lamen-
table phenomenon; one suspect is the incentiye afforded by federal welfare measures, insti-
tuted in the 1960s, for mothers to raise their children without the benefit of marriage. 
14 See 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992). 
15 See, e.g., Robert W. Tracinski, Ameriw's "Field oj the Blackbirds": How the Campaign jor 
Reparations jor Slave1) Pe1petuatcs Racism, 3 J.L. SOC'y 145, 157 (2002) (describing estimates 
ranging from $1.4 trillion to $24 trillion). 
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vidual descendant of American slavery. In short, this loss, like the 
business plaintiffs claim for lost profits, is not legally cognizable. 
b. Restitution for Unjust Enrichment 
The second claim, restitution, fares little better. Indeed, if restitu-
tion is merely a tort remedy there is nothing to add to my earlier 
comments on duty and causation. If restitution is, in this context, a 
separate cause of action, there remain two major obstacles to its ap-
plication to a claim for reparations. 
First, as discussed in connection with the claim for wrongful 
confinement, the present value of the profits derived from slavery by 
any given contemporary defendant is virtually impossible to calculate. 
It can only be guesswork. Few corporate defendants will have records 
adequate to prove such profits, and no individual will have such re-
cords. For example, how would you establish the present value of the 
profits derived from slavery by any given white descendant of Thomas 
Jefferson? 
Second, even if one is able to surmount the obstacle of adequate 
proof of the amount of these speculative profits, there remains the 
task of establishing that restitution from a contemporary proxy for an 
ante-bellum profiteer from slavery will actually further restitution's 
objectives-deterring "market bypassing and unambiguously-socially-
undesirable conduct"16 and ensuring public peace by discouraging 
extra-legal retaliation. No doubt, such an award would deter any pre-
sent-day person from engaging in slavery, but that is not a real prob-
lem in twenty-first century America. It is far more plausible to argue 
that restitution ensures public peace by assuaging the hurt and anger 
felt by many black Americans. Nevertheless, a felt sense of injustice, by 
itself, is not a sufficient foundation for restitution. The classic case for 
restitution in tort, as a separate cause of action, is to punish a bad ac-
tor (and deter him from further misconduct) by delivering his ill-
gotten gains to his victim. vVith reparations there are only proxies for 
long-dead bad actors, there will be no deterrence, and wholly specula-
tive gains will be delivered to people who are, at worst, proxies for 
long-dead victims and, at best, people who suffer in varying degrees 
from the remote vestiges of slavery. 
I am not contending that racism is dead (it surely is not; racism is a 
far harder disease to extirpate than smallpox). Neither am I arguing 
16 See HYLTON, SLAVERY AND TORT, supra note II, at 43. 
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that there is no connection between slavery and racism (of course there 
is). I am contending only that the nexus between slavery and the pres-
ent forces that produce the sense of injustice felt by black Americans 
today is too attenuated to merit a judicial award of damages based on 
restitution. Like the causation element of standing in constitutional law, 
the injury must be "fairly traceable" to slavery through a chain that con-
tains no links of independent causation. In short, tort lawsuits for repa-
rations will win publicity but little if any damages. 
B. Conventional Justice 
The exception to this assessment is the category of reparations 
suits that seeks conventional justice. A prototypical such case is the 
suit filed by Professor Ogletree, among others, seeking damages for 
the Tulsa race riotP First, as Professor Brophy has painstakingly 
documented in his book on the Tulsa riot, Reconstructing the Dream-
land,18 there is no doubt whatever that the riot was an act of official 
violence, patently illegal at the time it was committed. Second, the 
governmental entities that committed those unlawful acts exist today. 
Third, there are presently existing people who were the direct and 
immediate victims of this official violence. 19 
These facts combine to distinguish claims for damages attributable 
to the Tulsa riot from claims for damages attributable to slavery. Unlike 
Tulsa, claims for damages due to slavery seek recovery for acts lawful at 
the time committed, often asserted against entities that did not commit 
those acts, and by people who were not themselves the injured party. 
These are not formalities; these differences reflect the fact that our le-
gal culture is one of individual rights and responsibilities. Indeed, a 
fundamental organizing principle of our legal system is that rights and 
responsibilities are individual matters. Some sneer at the supposed 
fiction of the individual rights-bearer, and many advocates of repara-
tions enthusiastically embrace the notion of collective rights and collec-
tive liability, but they have the burden of proving why it is that we 
should displace our fundamental notions of individual rights and re-
sponsibilities with a collectivist version of rights and responsibilities. 
17 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Alexander v. Governor of Oklahoma (N.D. Okla. filed Feb. 
28,2003) (No.03-CV-133). 
18 See ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 
1921 (2002). 
19 Charles J. Ogletree, Tulsa Repamtions: The Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 
13,18 (2004) (stating there are over 120 survivors of the riot still living). 
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The collectivist notion of rights and obligations is curiously atavis-
tic, rooted in the same impulse that created the theological fiction of 
original sin. Human freedom means having the freedom to make 
choices and to accept the consequences that result from those choices. 
The quintessentially American version of this idea is that you should be 
free to shape yourself. 
Individuality does not come without risk. Consider why it is that 
American literature teachers still assign the only good novel Scott 
Fitzgerald ever wrote, in which Jay Gatsby sprang from his own Pla-
tonic conception of himself and turned out to be dark, troubled, and 
criminally tragic. Fitzgerald concluded that "we beat on, boats against 
the current, borne back ceaselessly in to the past. "20 Here, brill ian tly 
captured in metaphor, is the essential dilemma of the reparations de-
bate: We beat on in our individual cockleshells, armed with our rights 
and responsible for our own actions alone, but we beat against the 
current of our past racial injustice and are borne back ceaselessly into 
that past. If we are to best that current, we must confront it, then tame 
it, in order to glide with tranquility to some happy land beyond. Rec-
onciling ourselves with the past so that we may valiantly face the fu-
ture is the domain of politics, not law. 
II. POLITICS 
Tort law will probably not provide redress to those who seek repa-
rations for slavery, but the political realm may prove to be a more ade-
quate forum. What is the strength of the case for using the political sys-
tem to effect a massive redistribution of wealth from white Americans 
to black Americans? This redistribution might take the form of direct 
cash transfers or indirect transfers in the form of social welfare benefits 
or subsidies that are distinctly race-based. 21 For the sake of simplicity, I 
will lump these together as monetary reparations. There are a host of 
problems with monetary reparations, but most can be grouped into 
one of two broad categories: pragmatic problems and consequential 
problems. Because this topic is so vast and my space and time are so 
limited, I content myself with the academician's primary job-asking 
questions. 
20 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 189 (Scribner Books 1992) (1925). 
21 But see David Lyons, Reparations and Equal Opportunity, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 177 
(2004) (discussing a series of race-neutral social welfare programs that could take the 
place of reparations specifically targetd to blacks). 
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A. Pragmatic Problems 
Who should benefit from reparations? Should all blacks benefit, 
including immigrants not descended from slaves? Should this class of 
beneficiaries also include descendents of Native-American slaves? 
What sort of proof would one need to establish eligibility if only the 
descendants of slaves are eligible for reparations? If all blacks are eli-
gible, what determines who is black? It would be ironic if in imple-
menting a race-based form of reparations it would be necessary to 
employ a rule of law defining race; such legal definitions would emu-
late the legal regimes of the Jim Crow South and Nazi Germany. 
Should benefits be equal among all recipients? Should Oprah 
Winfrey, Johnnie Cochran, Richard Parsons, or Denzel Washington, 
to name just a few spectacularly successful black Americans, receive 
the same amount as a minister, a postal clerk, an army sergeant, a 
manual laborer, or an unemployed single mother? 
Should causation have any role to play? Should beneficiaries be 
required to prove some causal link between slavery and their individ-
ual current condition? Should there be any relevance to the fact that 
the economic condition of most American blacks is far better than 
that of African blacks?22 
Who should pay? Should funds come from all non-blacks, includ-
ing Latinos, Asians, Indians, and those whose ancestors immigrated to 
America after the end of slavery? Should funds come only from white 
Americans, or, perhaps, only the descendants of slave owners? If so, 
how do we determine the identity of these people? What degree of ge-
netic connection would be enough to hold a person liable? Consider 
again the morality and wisdom of using law to identify the requisite de-
gree of genetic taint in order to est.:'lblish stigma and liability. Into what 
category should we place a person who is descended from both Tho-
mas Jefferson and Sally Hemings? Into what category should we place a 
person who has one grandparent of Chinese ancestry, another of Irish 
ancestry, a third who is indigenous to the Peruvian highlands, and the 
fourth who was a Russian immigrant? Should it matter if the Irish an-
cestor was a slaveholder? What if the Irish slaveholder came to America 
as an indentured servant? These are not fanciful questions; they de-
serve serious answers if any reparations scheme is to blossom. 
22 See DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR 
SLAVERY 12 (2002). 
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B. Consequential Problems 
The single largest consequential problem with reparations stems 
directly from taking seriously the arguments of such reparations advo-
cates as Professor Richard America and Randall Robinson. Repara-
tions are intended to pay The Debt: What AmClica Owes to Blacks, to 
quote the title of Robinson's book on the subject.23 Similarly, Profes-
sor America titles his book, Paying the Social Debt: What 'White AmClica 
Owes Black America.24 This raises the following practical conundrum: If 
non-black America pays "The Debt" by cash or other transfers of pres-
ent wealth, what is the justification for the continued use of race-
based affirmative action? One such justification is that cash repara-
tions, like damages, pay for past wrongs and racial preferences act as 
injunctive relief to prevent future wrongs. This is a plausible 
justification, but it is both politically impracticable and laden with ex-
traordinary potential for racial division and animosity. Mfirmative ac-
tion in the wake of a broad reparations scheme would be politically 
impracticable because non-black America is unlikely to accept the 
premise that it must pay twice for a single wrong. It will inflame racial 
divisions if cash reparations are made on the premise that they extin-
guish "The Debt," but non-black America learns afterwards that it was 
only a down payment, with a continued obligation to provide race-
based preferences. One need not be clairvoyant to predict that a great 
tsunami of anger and racial division will ensue. Advocates of repara-
tions need to confront the political consequences of success. 
The second consequential problem is embedded in the first prob-
lem. If thirty years of race-based affirmative action has produced many 
benefits, it has also generated widespread unpopularity, and that un-
popularity is not limited to those who receive no benefits from 
affirmative action. Whatever the scope and value of its benefits, 
affirmative action has, to quote Professor Schuck, "created new barriers 
to inter-racial reconciliation and heightened the salience and divisive-
ness of race-precisely the opposite of the advocates' originally [sic] 
goals. "25 If that has been the effect of affirmative action, what will be 
the effect of a massive race-based wealth redistribution effected 
through political coercion? Consider also the consequences to the po-
23 See ROBINSON, sujJl<1 note 8. 
24 See AMERICA, sujJra note 8. 
25 Peter H. Schuck, Slavery Reparations: ll. Misguided Movement. at http://jurist.law.pitt 
.edu/forum/forumnew78.php (Dec. 9, 2002). For a thorough assessment of the effects of 
affirmatiye action, see Peter H. Schuck, i1ffinnative A.ction: Past, Pn;sent, and Future, 20 YALE 
L. & POL'y REV. 1 (2002). 
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litical process of adopting any governmental system of race- or ethnic-
based wealth transfers.26 Once such a system is established, or even 
once the idea is established that overtly race-based wealth transfers are 
possible and legitimate, people will organize along racial lines to obtain 
the transfers. 
There is nothing unique to race about this phenomenon, which 
economists call rent seeking. Economists also note that narrowly con-
centrated interest groups are more effective in the social competition 
for rents than larger and more diffuse groups, which explains why the 
media moguls prevail over the interests of individual consumers when 
it comes to the manufacture of copyright law.27 Thus, once govern-
ments start making race-based transfer payments, there are strong in-
centives to establish an identity within the benefited racial 
classification. We can observe this phenomenon at work in the tribal 
identities of enrolled tribes that operate lucrative casinos under the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Presently enrolled tribal members 
have an incentive to exclude un-enrolled people who have a plausible 
connection to the tribe, and those outsiders clamor to become part of 
the tribe.28 Race-based wealth transfers raise the very real specter of 
governments creating incentives for honing an exquisite sense of ra-
cial consciousness and encouraging elaborate and divisive meclla-
nisms for determining racial identities. One must wonder whether 
that is the vision of pluralism and diversity to which we aspire. One 
must also wonder whether, given our past errors, we wish to continue 
postponing separation of race and state. 
The third consequential problem of reparations is that they 
would divert attention from other possible approaches to the various 
social pathologies that afflict our nation. So far, we have been doing 
something right with regard to race, regardless of the distance that we 
may yet have to travel. Since 1940, the median income of black males 
26 My comments on this point are inspired by Jennifer Roback, The Separation of Rtlce 
and State, 14 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 58 (1991). 
27 See Dennis S. Karjala, Opposing Copyright Extension, at http://www.law.asu.edu/Home 
Pages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtensioll (last visited Oct. 20, 2003). Thi5 website is 
maintained by Arizona State University law professor Dennis Karjala and contains numer-
ous links to articles and congressional testimony contending that copyright extension, 
particularly via the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 
Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in various sections of 17 U.S.C.). favored copyright owners at 
the expense of consumers. ld. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001). 
28 See Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Playing the Political Slots, TIME, Dec. 23, 
2002, at 53; Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, lVhcel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 16, 2002, 
at 47, 57. 
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has risen from 41 % of that of white males to 67%; the median income 
of black females has risen from 36% of that of white females to 87%.29 
In 1995, the median income of black two-parent families was 88% of 
the median income of white two-parent families, and even that dispar-
ity is partially explained by the fact that 56% of those black families 
lived in the South, the region with the lowest wages in America.3o The 
percentage of black households living below the government's "pov-
erty line" has declined from 48% in 1959 to 22% in 1999.31 Since 1940 
the proportion of black males holding middle-class occupations has 
risen over six times; the proportion of black females holding such jobs 
has risen over nine times.32 It is true that these numbers hardly sug-
gest equality-only 32% of black males and 60% of black females held 
"middle-class" jobs as of 1990.33 Poverty is still a fixture of too much of 
black America-some 22% of black Americans live in poverty. Rea-
sonable people may differ as to the causes of the disparity. Repara-
tions advocates say that this is the legacy of slavery. Perhaps they are 
right, but there is room for various interpretations. Stephen and Abi-
gail Thernstrom, in their book America in Black and lVhite, conclude 
that "it is family structure that largely divides the haves from the have-
nots in the black community. The population in poverty is made up 
overwhelmingly of single mothers. "34 
Slavery can hardly be the cause of the increase of single mother 
households in the black community. In mid-twentieth century Amer-
ica, more than two-thirds of black children were born into two parent 
families; at the end of the century more than two-thirds of black chil-
dren were born into single-mother families. 35 This is not the forum to 
debate why this happened, but it is not credible to assert that this 
twentieth century single-mother phenomenon is the immediate (or 
even the plausibly remote) result of slavery. It is a contemporary fail-
ure. Pouring the monetary salve of reparations into this social wound 
will help somewhat, but is it the best cure? 
If debate about reparations is to be serious, there must be con-
sideration of alternative approaches to the structural problem of ine-
qualities of wealth. This is not the forum in which to propose or ex-
29 See MCWHORTER, supra note 12, at 9-10. 
30 [d. at 10. 
gl Hylton, Framework, supra note I, at 34 tbl.1. 
32 THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 10, at 185 tbl.1. 
33 See id. 
34 [d. at 237. 
35 [d. at 239-40. 
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amine such alternatives in detail, but one can readily imagine a range 
of expensive social welfare initiatives that could be delivered on a 
race-neutral basis while still producing a meaningful impact on the 
problem of structural wealth inequality.36 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
The constitutional problems associated with reparations depend 
on the nature of the reparations. Given the limited time and space at 
my disposal, these comments are mere cursory observations. 
Racial classifications, whether malignant or benign, are pre-
sumed to violate the Equal Protection guarantee, and may only be 
upheld if the government can prove that the classification is necessary 
(or narrowly tailored) to accomplish a compelling government objec-
tive.37 Race-based reparations are thus subject to strict scrutiny. While 
strict scrutiny of race-based reparations might not prove fatal, a ra-
cially neutral reparations scheme would be presumptively valid and 
subject only to minimal scrutiny. This would virtually assure its validity, 
but how can reparations for slavery be racially neutral? 
If the beneficiaries of reparations are limited to those who are 
descended from slaves, it is possible that the relevant classification 
would not be race-based. Such a classification would be similar to the 
Supreme Court's classification, in Geduldig v. Aiello, of pregnant peo-
ple and non-pregnant people as not based on sex.38 Nevertheless, a 
similar reparations scheme is unlikely to work, if only because of the 
difficulty of proving that one is descended from slaves. Self-serving 
declarations based on oral history will not do. Ultimately, some form 
of presumption would be necessary, and that presumption would in-
evitably be race-based. 
Even if reparations were not based on race, reparations would be 
susceptible to an attack that they were motivated by race. Thus, under 
the principle of Washington v. Davis, reparations would be subject to 
strict scrutiny unless the government could prove that it would have 
enacted its reparations program for non-racial reasons, a rebuttal that 
would be extremely difficult to prove.39 Because monetary reparations 
36 See generally Lyons, supra note 21. 
37 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995); City of Richmond 
v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989). 
38 See 417 U.S. 484, 494-97 (1974). 
39 See 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976). 
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are likely to require a racial classification, however, strict scrutiny will 
apply to any Equal Protection challenge of the program.40 
The first problem for those who might wish to challenge such 
reparations, however, is standing. The key problem is establishing per-
sonal il~ury in fact. So-called "taxpayer" standing may not suffice. After 
l'alley F01ge Cl117stiall College tI. Americalls United for Sej)aration of Church & 
State, Inc., the scope of taxpayer standing has been, in effect, restricted 
to the precise facts of Flast tI. Cohen-governmen tal expenditures that 
allegedly violate the Establishment Clause. 41 Yet l'alley F01ge did not 
overrule Flast, and it may be possible for a federal taxpayer to claim 
successfully that his taxpayer status enables him to challenge govern-
mental expenditures that are openly race-based as a violation of Equal 
Protection. If taxpayer status is insufficient to confer standing, however, 
it is difficult to conceive of a likely plain tiff with standing. The fact that 
a government expenditure based on race alone is a presumptive viola-
tion of Equal Protection does not enable any American to assert its in-
validity, for such a plaintiff's claim is a mere generalized grievance, one 
shared by everyone and without particularized injury in fact.42 Consider 
the injury that supported standing of the plaintiff in Jacobs tI. Ban;43 in 
which the plaintiff challenged the constitutional validity of reparation 
payments to victims of the '",",orId War II Japanese internment camps. 
"Arthur Jacobs, an American citizen who says he was det.:'lined with his 
German father in 1945, argues [that because] the Act compensates in-
40 The constitutional "alidity of the Ciyil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.c. app. 
§§ 1989b-1989b9 (2000), which prOYided a $20,000 payment to each person of Japanese 
ancestry who was deprived of liberty or property as a result of the forcible relocation and 
confinement of American citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry during 
World War II, was upheld in jacobs v. Ban; 959 F.2d 313, 314-15, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In 
jacobs, a pre-Adamnd opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invoked Metro 
Broadcasting, Ilic. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), and applied intermediate scrutiny, but 
opined in dicta that the Act would survive strict scrutiny. jacobs, 959 F.2d at 318. The court 
suggested that the Act would survive strict scrutiny because the government's purpose-to 
redress an act of racial discrimination that, although declared valid at the time in Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), has since been widely repudiated as unjust, un-
constitutional, and based on government misconduct in the courts-was compelling and 
the cash reparations were a narrmvly tailored way to provide some restitution to the imme-
diate and direct victims of the Japanese exclusion order. Sec jacobs, 959 F.2d at 32l. 
For more on the government misconduct. which consisted of deliberate lies to the 
Supreme Court, see KOl'cmatsll v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406,1417-18 (N.D. Cal. 1984); 
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). 
41 See Valley Forge Christian Coli. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 488-90 (1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1968). 
42 Sec, e.g., Schlesinger Y. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-17 
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173-75 (1974). 
43 959 F.2d at 313. 
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terns of Japanese and Aleutian, but not German, descent ... it denies 
him the equal protection of the laws."44 By this principle, reparations 
for slavery limited to Americans of African ancestry might be chal-
lenged by someone whose ancestors were American Indians held in 
slavery, or perhaps even by someone whose ancestor was an English-
man bound to indentured servitude. 
On the merits, the government would contend that its compel-
ling purpose is remedial: to provide some measure of restitution for 
the moral abomination of slavery and to assuage its present effects. 
There are several problems with this purpose. First, although morally 
obnoxious, slavery was not a constitutional wrong. In Jacobs, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dealt with this contention in 
connection with reparations to Japanese-American internees by not-
ing that a congressional commission 
found unambiguously that Executive Order No. 9066 [author-
izing the internments] and the military orders affecting Japa-
nese Americans were the products of prejudice and dema-
goguery, rather than military necessity . . . . Congress noted 
that the premises relied on in Supreme Court decisions up-
holding the internment have been repudiated by scholars, by 
former government officials, and more recently, by courts. 45 
The second problem with the government's stated purpose of as-
suaging the present effects of slavery is that the objective becomes one 
of seeking to remedy broad societal effects of unconstitutional racism, a 
purpose that the Court has hinted may be insufficiently compelling to 
44 [d. at 314. 
45 [d. at 315. For this proposition the Court of Appeals cited H.R. Rep. No. 278, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1987) and stated: 
[d. 
In 1983, Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru Y.'lsui, who had 
challenged the constitutionality of the internment, reopened their landmark 
federal cases through writs of error coram nobis. Their wartime convictions for 
defying the internment policy were vacated, based on evidence that the gov-
ernment had misrepresented and suppressed evidence that racial prejudice, 
not military necessity, motivated the internment of Japanese Americans. Ko-
rematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); \asui v. United States, 83-151 BE (D. Or. 
1984), remanded, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985). None of the decisions was 
reversed on appeal. For an admirable review of the history of the internment 
policy, see Hohri v. United States, ... 782 F.2d 227, 231-39 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(Wright,].), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 ... (1987). 
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surmount strict s(Tlltiny.46 As Justice Scalia has put it more colorfully, 
"under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor 
or a debtor race. "47 
Even if the Court accepted that atoning for the costs of societal 
racism is a compelling objective, there remains the problem of prov-
ing that reparations are narrowly tailored to accomplishing its stated 
objective. A host of non-racially based initiatives would perhaps be 
better suited to addressing the differential wealth effects that repara-
tions advocates attribute to slavery and racism.48 'Without proof of the 
inability of such programs to accomplish the objective of remedying 
the present effects of race-based slavery, a race-based reparations pro-
gram would almost surely founder on the rock of narrow tailoring. 
The funding device for reparations may present additional prob-
lems. If a special tax were levied only on the descendants of slave-
holders, it would be susceptible to attack as a bill of attainder. If 
specific property were seized as the fruits of slave labor, such seizures 
would be susceptible to attack as an uncompensated taking. Moreover, 
because of the extreme difficulty of proving who is descended from 
slaveholders, some sort of racial presumption would likely be neces-
sary to administer such a special tax. If that were the case, strict scnl-
tiny would apply and the mirror image of the problems just discussed 
would emerge. If, however, reparations were funded by all Americans 
out of general revenues, there would be no peculiar constitutional 
46 Sec. e.g., City of Richmond Y.].A. Croson Co., 488 u.s. 469, 499 (1989). The Court 
states: 
While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public dis-
crimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for 
black entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid 
racial quota in the awarding of public contracts in Richmond .... [A] n 
amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular in-
dustry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota. 
!d. Left unclear in this enigmatic passage is whether the defect is a poor fit of remedy to 
objectiye ("an unyielding racial quota") or whether it is the overly broad remedial purpose 
("an amorphous claim [of] past discrimination"). Justice Scalia is more direct: "The be-
nign purpose of compensating for social disadyantages, whether they have been acquired 
by reason of prior discrimination or otherwise, can [not] be pursued by the illegitimate 
means ofracial discrimination, ... " Id. at 520 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
47 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S, 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia,]., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[G]overnment can never have a 'compelling 
interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial dis-
crimination in the opposite direction. "). 
48 Sec, e.g., Lyons, supra note 21, at 183-185. 
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difficulties with funding, although the Equal Protection problems 
with the expenditures would remain. 
This is no more than a brief glance at the constitutional difficulties 
of a reparations program. Under existing doctrine, an explicitly race-
based program of reparations is quite possibly unconstitutional. This is 
not to say that the existing doctrine is incapable of change; it may well 
be the case that a reparations program could be the occasion for 
change. Such change, however, seems unlikely with the current Court. 
CONCLUSION 
I am a skeptic about the practical prospects of reparations. Repa-
rations to people who have suffered personal injury by tortfeasors, as 
is sought in the case of the Tula race riot, should succeed, though 
there are substantial obstacles to such claims in the form of limita-
tions statutes and sovereign immunity.49 Reparations for the general-
ized and diffuse injuries that are attributable, in some measure, to 
two-and-a-half centuries of slavery and another hundred years of ra-
cial apartheid, are even less probable. Advocates for such reparations 
seem much like Dorothy and her companions, facing a very arduous 
struggle with many huge obstacles, and with no assurance that once 
they have made it onto the yellow brick road and entered the fabled 
City of Oz, they will find that there is anything of value behind the 
green curtain. Yet I have always been a pessimist, and have long sub-
scribed to the faux Biblical proverb: "Blessed is he that expecteth 
nothing, for he shall not be disappointed." 
49 Sec generally BROPHY, supra note 18. 
